My focus here is on two questions: Does philosophy have a place in contemporary American public life? and should philosophy have a place in American public life? Because my answer to the first question is negative, I also will discuss some of the reasons why I believe philosophy does not play a role in American public life. I suggest that philosophers have been excluded from the public conversation in part because the work of philosophy entails criticism and challenge—activities best accomplished (...) from “outside” of the structures of power. This means that we have a role in public life, but it is an indirect role, as teachers and critics, not as advisers and active participants. (shrink)

What are physical quantities, and in particular, what makes them quantitative? This book presents an original answer to this question through the novel position of substantival structuralism, arguing that quantitativeness is an irreducible feature of attributes, and quantitative attributes are best understood as substantival structured spaces.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This chapter focuses on the question of quantitativeness – of identifying the feature that makes quantitative properties quantitative. The chapter begins with two traditional attempts at capturing what makes a property quantitative – being numerical and being determinable – and argues that neither is satisfactory. The chapter then turns to influential recent proposals which, inspired by the Representational Theory of Measurement, attempt to identify particular relations as characteristic of quantitative properties. These attempts fare better than the traditional ones, but have (...) their own limitations. It concludes with a discussion of a new recent criterion for quantitativeness, which builds on a more abstract understanding of the representational theory of measurement. (shrink)

In Chapter 6, Johanna E. Wolff uses models of measurements as a case for exploring two forms of scientific realism that are meant to address the problem of plurality of models in science: structural realism and perspectival realism. She distinguishes their motivations in the following way: structural realists address the plurality of models by looking for similarities, namely structural commonalities, between the models, whereas perspectival realists emphasize how differences among a plurality of models can be complementary. In comparing these realist (...) alternatives, Wolff chooses to focus on measurement theory. Wolff urges the idea that perspectival realism and structural realism are not competing realist accounts but complementary ones. (shrink)

Nous considérons la structure dans son rapport au temps : sous ce rapport, la structure est normative, et l’avenir aide à constituer le présent et le passé. Des exemples sont empruntés à l’embryologie et à la géologie. On explique pourquoi il est difficile de concevoir une structure cosmique spatio-temporelle, et comment le développement récent de la physique nous y aide ; dans cette physique, la notion de structure cosmique a un rôle éminent. Il en résulte que seules sont viables les (...) combinaisons qui sont dans La ligne historique de la nature. (shrink)